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PROVOCATION AS A COMPLETE DEFENCE 
TO TRESPASS TO THE PERSON 
ANDREW PINGREE∗
The basis on which the law of trespass to the person denies mitigation of 
compensatory damages is a purely philosophical position which can be 
described as high minded but impractical. The law is criticised in this 
article on a number of bases including the fact that the leading case, Fontin 
v Katapodis, established this position without revealing the judicial 
reasoning which was applied. The notion of a victim’s fundamental right 
not to be touched or threatened is criticised and an argument of implied 
consent by the provocateur is put, as also is an argument that a person’s 
actions can be so much a function of external influences that their blame 
ought to be reduced proportionally. Some policy considerations are also 
raised to justify a change in the law. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
It is well established law in Australia that the award of exemplary damages 
can be mitigated or denied if the plaintiff provoked the assault or battery that 
he or she complains of. That makes provocation a partial defence. This article 
puts the case that provocation may be arguable as a defence to an action and 
as grounds for mitigation or elimination of compensatory damages too. 
Because both assault and battery are trespasses, and because the complete 
defences of consent, necessity, self defence, defence of property, and the 
retaking of goods apply equally to both, the two actions will be discussed 
together in this article. Some of the sources cited herein refer to provocation 
as a subset of the pleading of contributory negligence (which is based on 
statute law in non-Australian jurisdictions). Provocation is not approached 
that way here, but rather as a common law defence in its own right. 
It is necessary, in order to commence a discussion of provocation, to define it 
clearly. Unfortunately, in Australian tort law it is difficult to find a clearly 
articulated definition of provocation. But thanks to judicial treatment of the 
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Contributory Negligence Act of Alberta (Canada)1
Provocation is defined as conduct that would cause a reasonable person to 
lose self control ... To be recognised by the law, the provocation must occur 
in close proximity to the assault ... It might amount to no more than 
taunting, insults or annoyance, in which case it is neither a tort nor a crime 
... On the other hand, provocation may arise from [a criminal] assault, a 
trespass, or some other conduct that is a tort or crime, or both.
, there is such a definition 
in Canadian common law. Slatter J, in Wilson v Bobbie, stated that: 
2
This is quite similar to the definition in British and Australian criminal law. 
For example, in Mancini v Director of Public ProsecutionsViscount Simon 
LC said: 
 
It is not all provocation that will reduce the crime of murder to 
manslaughter. Provocation, to have that result, must be such as temporarily 
deprives the person provoked of the power of self control, as the result of 
which he commits the unlawful act which causes death… 
The test to be applied is that of the effect of the provocation on a reasonable 
man, as was laid down by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Lesbini [R v 
Lesbini [1914] 3 KB 1116] ... so that an unusually excitable or pugnacious 
individual is not entitled to rely on provocation which would not have led 
an ordinary person to act as he did. In applying the test, it is of particular 
importance (a) to consider whether a sufficient interval has elapsed since 
the provocation to allow a reasonable man time to cool ... 3
Provocation in homicide is judged both according to the subjective standard 
of whether the defendant was indeed provoked, and the objective standard of 
whether the situation would provoke a reasonable person. One must keep two 
points in mind, however. Firstly, in criminal proceedings for charges less than 
homicide (that is, those equivalent to common battery and assault) 
provocation can be taken into account only in sentencing. The sentence is 
equivalent to the calculation of damages at tort, which means that the criminal 
law model suggests maintaining provocation only as a partial defence. 
Secondly, according to the court in R v Kirkham
 
4 and then the treatment of 
that judgment in R v Smith,5
                                                 
1 RSA 2000 Ch C-27 
 the criminal concept of provocation is one of 
2 (2006) ABQB 22, [17], applying Hurley v Moore (1993) 107 DLR (4th) 664 (Newfoundland 
Court of Appeal). 
3 [1942] AC 1, 9. 
4 (1837) 8 C&P 115, 117; 173 ER 422. 
5 R v Smith [2001] 1 AC 146.  
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compassion for human frailty, and not a scaling of the charge according to 
what the defendant meant by his or her actions. The criminal concept of 
provocation was of special value when the penalty for murder was death. 
Therefore it assists us only in establishing a definition and test, whereas we 
seek here to apply the definition and test to situations to which the criminal 
law does not apply them. But, in spite of these issues, the adoption of the 
criminal definition at Canadian tort law provides a solid basis on which to 
proceed. 
II ESTABLISHED LAW 
The leading case with respect to battery in Australian law, albeit not the 
original case, is Fontin v Katapodis.6 As it was decided by the High Court, all 
lower courts are bound to follow it unless distinctions can be found, or unless 
the High Court itself finds fault with and overrules it. During an altercation, 
the defendant, a glass cutter, threw a piece of glass at the plaintiff in response 
to the plaintiff having first struck the defendant with a T-square. (The 
defendant was accused by the plaintiff of having stolen something on a 
previous visit to the plaintiff’s workplace). Both Owen J and McTiernan J 
recognised independently that prior authorities show exemplary damages to 
be disallowed where provocation is proven. Prima facie, then, provocation is a 
partial defence to battery. But provocation was ruled to be irrelevant in 
relation to the plaintiff’s entitlement to compensation; thus, a plaintiff must 
receive full compensation regardless of how much he/she has pushed the 
defendant into lashing out. Fontin is generally referred to as authority for this 
rule, for example in Lane v Holloway,7
Just as there are varying degrees of assault and battery, attracting varying 
sums in damages, there are also varying degrees of provocation. In spite of 
this t he law in Australia is somewhat harsh towards the Defendant in that any 
provocation, whether small or great, is disregarded by courts to the same 
effect. In Whitfield v De Lauret & Co Ltd
 which is authority for the same 
principle in the United Kingdom. As for assault, by nature it is a lesser tort 
than whatever battery it may purport to precede, so it is not unreasonable to 
expect a court to behave with at least similar clemency in the case of a 
provoked assault. 
8
                                                 
6 (1962) 108 CLR 177.  
 Knox CJ stated: ‘Damages may be 
either compensatory or exemplary ... Exemplary damages are given only in 
cases of conscious wrongdoing in contumelious disregard of another's rights.’ 
7 [1968] 1 QB 379. The ruling in this case was based on Fontin, above n 6. 
8 (1920) 29 CLR 71.  
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The dictionary definition of ‘contumelious’ shows that it is by no means a 
strong word. Describing an ‘insulting display of contempt in words or actions; 
contemptuous or humiliating treatment,’9
It is worth considering cases where the provocation and the response to it are 
of varied intensities and are balanced in different ways. In Murphy v Culhane, 
the balance of the facts was, as Lord Denning MR observed, more favourable 
to the defendant. His Lordship considered that the pleading should have been 
one of self defence and not provocation, in which case the defendant would 
have succeeded.
 it catches any offensive physical act 
done in anger, whether provoked or unprovoked; whether extreme or 
moderate.  
10
the conduct of the injured man was trivial – and the conduct of the 
defendant was savage – entirely out of proportion to the occasion. So much 
so that the defendant could fairly be regarded as solely responsible for the 
damage done. I do not think [exemplary damages] ... can or should be 
applied where the injured man, by his own conduct, can fairly be regarded 
as partly responsible for the damage he suffered.
 In his brief ratio he commented on Lane and on Fontin, 
where: 
11
Lord Denning went on to approve that damages per se should either be 
mitigated or aggravated according to the circumstances of the case. In so 
doing he reiterated his earlier ratio in Gray v Barr
  
12 where he mentioned a 
variety of factors that a jury might wish to take into account in tailoring the 
sum of compensation. Blay has represented this as authority for the mitigation 
of compensatory damages in the context of provocation.13 But Lord Denning 
went on to say in Gray that, ‘In their [the bereaved party’s] claim, all 
questions of the provocation to Mr Barr and the conduct of Mr Gray are 
irrelevant.’14
                                                 
9 Random House Dictionary, Random House, 2010. 
 It is possible then that, rather than vaguely suggesting that the 
law should take an appropriate opportunity to change for the better, when his 
Honour referred to tailoring the sum of compensation, he may simply have 
been loose with terminology. 
10 Murphy v Culhane [1977] QB 94, 97 
11 Murphy v Culhane [1977] QB 94, 98. 
12 [1971] 2 QB 554. 
13 S K N Blay, Provocation in Tort Liability. A Time for Re-assessment (1988) 4 Queensland 
University of Technology Law Journal 151, 158. 
14 Gray v Barr [1971] 2 QB 554. 
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Blay has also argued that the ruling in Fontin that provocation cannot mitigate 
compensatory damages is not based on solid grounds.15 Explaining this, he 
referred to Owen J having said that contemporary editions of Halsbury’s Laws 
of England16 and Sedgwick on Damages17 both recognised provocation as a 
partial defence to mitigate exemplary damages, but neither recognised 
provocation as a basis to mitigate compensation. Blay notes that neither 
source in fact makes any assertion on compensation, instead leaving the 
question very much alone. Owen J’s interpretation, therefore, seems 
regrettably exegetical. McTiernan J cited 15 cases and texts that apparently 
held differing views to demonstrate the controversy over whether provocation 
can mitigate compensatory damages. He then announced that he held ‘the 
view that there ought to be no reduction of actual or compensatory damages 
for provocation in the case of assault and battery’.18 His Honour did not 
explain the logic of that view.19
A A Possible Precedent for Mitigation of 
Compensation? 
 Thus the court bound Australian law to a 
position based neither on logical reasoning nor on precedent and that was not 
supported by a policy position. Therefore, the authority of Fontin is not 
flawless.  
While all well known authorities stand firmly against mitigation of 
compensation, one rarely-cited New Zealand case stands in favour of it in 
special circumstances. Moller J in Hoebergen v Koppens20
[I]n Hoebergen’s case the respondent plaintiff was well aware of previous 
hostility which had so nearly resulted in violence that he had to flee and had 
every reason to suppose that any insult from him would ‘almost inevitably’ 
result in violence. Moreover at the meeting which occasioned the battery the 
respondent could easily have walked away but he chose to stay and uttered 
the insult which brought on the attack. In short Moller J seemed to regard 
the coupling of verbal provocation with remaining in close proximity to the 
 recognised the 
authority of Lane that compensation is not to be mitigated. But he 
distinguished the facts of the case on the basis of the apparently great 
likelihood of a battery resulting from the insult that was uttered. As explained 
by Hudson: 
                                                 
15 Blay, above n 13, 153. 
16 Halsbury’s Laws of England vol 11 (Butterworths, 3rd ed, 1952–1964) 225. 
17 Sedgwick on Damages (8th edition, 1891) 384. 
18 Fontin v Katapodis (1962) 108 CLR 177, 180. 
19 Noted by Blay, above n 13, 153. 
20 [1974] 2 NZLR 597. 
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defendant when violence was ‘almost inevitable’, despite the fact that there 
was an easy means of escape, as contributory negligence going in reduction 
of compensatory damages.21
Provocation as a form of contributory negligence has been ruled out by 
various authorities
 
22 on the basis of statutory definitions. In Dellabarca v 
Northern Storemen and Packers Union, while Moller J’s interpretation of the 
statutory definition of ‘fault’ was discarded, his allowance of an exception due 
to the inevitability of the trespass, given the provocation, was retained.23 In 
the course of the present study no case has been found to overrule the point of 
interest here. But Hudson gives a worthwhile warning against taking 
Hoebergen as good law. Significantly, Moller J did not refer to the many 
existing authorities against mitigating compensatory damages for provocation. 
Hudson refers to a passage of Brooking J’s judgment in Horkin and the many 
cases and works cited therein.24 Brooking J put the law very firmly, stating at 
one point, ‘Clearly provocation is no defence to an action for battery. This is 
implicit in the decisions on whether provocation goes in mitigation of 
damages, and at times is made explicit in such decisions ...’25 Hudson regards 
Brooking J’s study of the authorities as exhaustive and notes that the position 
reached concurs also with American authority.26
B Fundamental Rights of the Victim 
 
It is a common argument for allowing nominal damages and full 
compensatory damages regardless of circumstances, that all people have a 
right not to have their physical wellbeing threatened or their person violated, 
even slightly. It might be said that, as provocation can serve to eliminate or 
mitigate exemplary damages, regardless of how slight or shocking the 
response is, it follows that, by provoking a trespass, the provocateur has in 
fact reduced his or her right not to be violated or threatened. However, while 
compensatory damages are about the rights of the plaintiff, exemplary 
damages (or punitive or aggravated damages) are about imposing punishment 
beyond mere compensation so as to teach the defendant a lesson. The rule of 
                                                 
21 A H Hudson, Contributory Negligence as a Defence to Battery (1984) 4:3 Legal Studies 332, 
336. 
22 See Horkin v North Melbourne Football Club [1983] 1 VR 153 and Dellabarca v Northern 
Storemen and Packers Union [1989] 2 NZLR 734 as examples. 
23 [1989] 2 NZLR 734, 798–99. 
24 Horkin v North Melbourne Football Club [1983] 1 VR 153, 159-162. 
25 Ibid 162. 
26 Hudson, above n 21, 338. 
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the plaintiff’s fundamental right may be seen to persist in combination with 
the additional amount awarded as punishment of the defendant. 
In Hill v Cooke 27
[T]he law provides a remedy for any damage or loss occasioned by a 
wrongful act and, therefore, if provocation brings the defendant to do any 
act in excess of lawful self-defence which results in personal injury and 
economic loss to the plaintiff, he is entitled to just and adequate damages, 
and to mitigate or reduce actual or compensatory damages is to deprive the 
plaintiff pro tanto of a legal right. 
 the damages at issue were nominal damages awarded for 
two slaps in the face. The damages remained payable in spite of provocation, 
as a recognition of the plaintiff’s right to have some sort of remedy for 
violation of his basic right not to be touched in a way that was uninvited. 
McTiernan J stated in Fontin:  
Owen J reached the same conclusion. McTiernan J went on: ‘This would 
seem to place actual or compensatory damages for assault and battery on the 
same footing as damages for personal injury caused by negligence.’ In 
essence this means that provocation reduces the fault element behind the 
attack, and that awarding a remedy nonetheless is justified by the award of an 
equal remedy for harm caused not purposefully but negligently. If provocation 
makes an otherwise intentional trespass less intentional and more negligent, 
then a suit in negligence is an option available to the plaintiff along with 
negligent trespass.28
But clearly, on the basis of cases such as Hill, the sum awardable in 
recognition of that fundamental right is very small. It does not logically 
follow from the light-handed treatment of this right, where it is violated 
without any injury, that, when there is an injury, full compensation is owing 
regardless of where the balance of fault lies between plaintiff and defendant. 
 By? pleading negligence, the plaintiff may permit his or 
her own actions to mitigate the damages, and such actions logically would 
include provoking the defendant. The question then arises,why should the one 
act be treated two different ways by the one justice system, where both causes 
can succeed? An answer may lie in the fact that, when suing in trespass, the 
plaintiff is saying, ‘My fundamental human right not to be violated or 
threatened was breached,’ whereas suing in negligence, he or she is saying, ‘I 
suffered harm due to something the defendant did or failed to do.’ In 
negligence there is no reference to a fundamental right and so the plaintiff 
does not bring that concept into the action at court. 
                                                 
27 Hill v Cooke (1958) 58 SR (NSW) 49. 
28 As an example of a negligent trespass, see Williams v Milotin (1957) 97 CLR 465. 
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The law of trespass fails to recognise the effort and determination, or lack 
thereof, that goes into both the trespass and the provocative act that preceded 
it. It may be said that where intense provocation is followed by a slight 
trespass, the law delivers injustice by imposing a penalty against the 
trespassor. The position of negligence law is more plausible than this. The 
cases of Andary v Burford  and Wagstaff v Haslam29
Blay has also argued that Owen J in Hill implicitly recognised that 
provocation can mitigate damages when he stated that the jury was entitled to 
award nominal damages for the provoked attack. However, the battery in 
question did not occasion injury; therefore the harm was not assessable. As in 
other fields of law, nominal damages are there as a recognition of the 
plaintiff’s right per se to a remedy, even when no recognisable harm has been 
suffered. Nominal damages are not a reduced form of compensation. (On this 
point see Blay’s own writings elsewhere).
 show that the plaintiff’s 
provocation of the defendant’s injurious act is equivalent to contributory 
negligence. Contributory negligence is used to mitigate compensatory 
damages in a negligence suit. Although a mitigation in compensation for 
contributory negligence may be taken as meaning that the plaintiff’s right not 
to be violated can be devalued, it can equally be said that the mitigation is not 
a finding of fault against the plaintiff for their contributing act and motive and 
manner of execution, but rather only a softening of the remedy according to 
their contribution to their own harm. The damages owing in the end are 
calculated by subtracting a sum representing the plaintiff’s degree of fault 
from what the plaintiff would otherwise deserve. Taken that way, a reduction 
in compensation for trespass does not militate at all against the concept of a 
fundamental right, but only serves to soften the response of the law to the 
violation of it. 
30
C Implied Consent 
  
An argument exists that provocateurs implicitly consent to the trespass they 
have provoked. As observed by Hudson: 
Prosser on Torts says that ‘if the plaintiff voluntarily places himself in the 
way of attack, his conduct may amount to consent and bar recovery.’ 
Professor Glanville Williams takes the same view, saying that the defence 
                                                 
29 Andary v Burford (1994) Aust Torts Reports 81-302 and in Wagstaff v Haslam [2006] 
NSWSC 294 (21 April 2006). 
30 Sam Blay, Torts (Lawbook, 4th ed, 1999). Online excerpt at <www.findlawaustralia.com.au 
>. 
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might be expressed in terms of consent or causation, the precise name not 
mattering.31
To think of provocation as a cause of a tort conjures up a picture of a person 
being provoked to the point of automatism so that their own will is no longer 
in play. On the other hand, provocation as evidence of consent and not 
causation implies a lesser form of provocation that puts the defendant in a 
state of outrage, but not automatism. If the plaintiff’s conduct is such as 
would quite clearly result in a reasonable person retaliating tortiously, then the 
plaintiff cannot succeed in arguing the lack of any awareness at all that he or 
she was consenting to a tortious response. It can be said that the concept of 
placing oneself in the way of harm is somewhat more relevant for the person 
who dashes onto a busy road to rescue a child than for someone who puts 
another’s temper and resolve to the test with ridicule or a challenge to a fight. 
The basis of the difference should be simply the obviousness with which the 
danger should appear to a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position. A form 
of provocation calculated to hurt and aimed at a person known for violence 
and vindictiveness, and whose physical prowess or socioeconomic power is 
sufficient to leave him or her with nothing to lose (apart from court action) in 
committing a trespasswould evince consent (or establish causation) much 
more than a mild throwaway line uttered to a person who may encounter 
difficulty by retaliating. Such a law unfortunately favours those who are 
dangerous and/or powerful, but the logic behind it ought not be ignored. This 
problem is a clear sign that any alteration to the law must cater for David and 
Goliath situations. No Goliath should be permitted to rely on his reputation or 
intimidating presence  to avoid compensating a David, regardless of whether 
the David was moved by valour, naivety, or base aggression. For that reason 
an argument of implied consent should not be allowed in so much as it is 
based on inequality between the parties. 
 
The case of Zinck v Strickland32 indicates a relationship in Canadian law 
between provocation and implied consent to battery.33
                                                 
31 Hudson, above n 21, 332–3. Citing Prosser on Torts: edition and page reference not given. 
 In that case the 
deceased, Mr Zinck, challenged Strickland to a fight in front of a tavern while 
holding a wooden beam. The co-defendant, Mr Brake, was a drunken patron 
who was apparently incensed at witnessing the challenge, and he stepped in to 
fight Zinck instead. Zinck eventually died of head injuries and his dependent 
mother sued. The court found that Zinck had implicitly consented to the 
32 Zinck v Strickland (1981) NSR (2d) 451. Brake was the second defendant. The fact that he 
was never challenged to a fight and only stepped in of his own accord was not considered. 
33 As expressed in footnotes by Blay, above n 13, 155. 
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violent acts of Brake by having sought to engage in violence himself. In citing 
this case Blay has written: 
By its very nature an act which is induced or provoked by the deliberate 
conduct of the plaintiff can hardly be classified as wrongful. If the plaintiff 
provokes a given conduct he in effect invites it; he thus implicitly consents 
to that interference with his rights. The action of the defendant in such cases 
cannot be deemed wrongful because as the maxim goes, “no harm is done to 
him who consents.”34
In Gordon v Levi 
 
35
for conduct to amount to fault contributing to the injury sustained, it must 
have a direct physical connection with the trespass concerned (“contributing 
fault”). It is not sufficient if the provocation derives merely from the 
contextual background.
 the Court declined, on the basis of preceding authorities, 
to strike a balance between the fault of the provoked defendant and of the 
provocateur plaintiff. The only exceptions allowed were where volenti non fit 
injuria and ex turpi causa non oritur actio apply. It was stated in obiter dicta 
in Gordon that: 
36
It was commented in Wilson that this ‘implies that the victim of a crime does 
not contribute to his or her own damage’.
 
37
                                                 
34 Blay, above n 13, 155. 
 (Such a position is validated on 
policy grounds by comments his Honour made earlier about violent situations 
where a finding of contribution by the victim of a crime would be 
undesirable). But there are problems with this position, as a ‘direct physical 
connection’ is impossible where assault rather than battery is concerned, and 
where the provocation is either verbal or implicit. If the defence of 
provocation is put totally out of reach in an action for assault, this would have 
the effect of making it a more serious offence than battery. This suggests that 
either the Canadian authorities or the appraisals of them are inadequate. It is 
perhaps better to suggest that the allowance of the defence of provocation 
where the defences of volenti and ex turpi apply, implies an allowance for 
provocation of such a serious nature that retaliation is virtually a certainty, or 
that retaliation is, in the sense of basic moral justice, perfectly reasonable. 
This does not necessarily restrict the scope of what is defensible to the realm 
of automatism. There is quite probably room to defend trespasses based on an 
intense — but predicable and reasonable — wish to defend the dignity of 
oneself or of another. 
35 [1993] EWJ 693 (CA). 
36 Gordon v Levi [1993] EWJ 693 (CA) [51]. 
37 Wilson v Bobbie (2006) ABQB 22, [23]. 
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D Causation and the Will 
The possibility of automatism was raised above in passing. We now turn to 
discuss that issue in depth. The Court in the classic case of Scott v Shepherd38 
traced the causation of the act which caused the plaintiff’s injury back, 
through a series of acts by different persons, to the defendant who had 
committed the initial, intentional act. A lit firecracker was thrown by the 
Defendant into a crowded market. The person who was first to be struck by it 
panicked and threw it away, whereupon it struck another person in the market, 
then another, and it finally exploded in a patron’s face causing blindness. 
Although each actor in the situation who encountered the ‘lighted squib’ had 
an option as to where to throw it, and although the last actor had an option of 
not throwing it at the plaintiff, the court ruled that each actor was acting not of 
his own free will, but in a panic resulting from the previous action. Implicitly, 
then, the act of the first person in the causal chain continued as the cause of 
each subsequent act, as if the subsequent actors were in a state of automatism. 
Meir Dan-Cohen has written a lengthy paper39 presenting a metaphysical 
argument on how the boundaries of the self extend into one’s social world due 
to the impact that the social world has on the mind. Considering provocation 
at tort, he has argued that defendants act not entirely of their own inner 
volition, but in reaction to external factors.40 One may say that when a 
person’s action is contributed to, at least in great part, by another person’s act 
of free will, then the will of the other person is carried through into the first 
person’s action, absolving the first person of some, or potentially all, blame. 
On this reasoning, when provocation is relevant, it would have the same effect 
as the defence of automatism in criminal law.41
Scott is not used as authority for provocation. The principal distinction is that 
the factor that evoked each successive act had nothing to do with the plaintiff, 
but rather the defendant. The causal chain in Scott, then, was the reverse of 
that which is to be expected in a case where provocation is relevant. But the 
response of each person was defensive and automatic, typical of torts that 
follow intense provocation, but just not directed at the provocateur. If one 
considers the well known ‘fight or flight’ response, in Scott it was flight (after 
a fashion) rather than fight, that took effect, but both are variant reactions 
under the one state of mind — that being panic of sufficient intensity to lead 
to automatism. It is arguable, then, that the law of trespass gives sufficient 
 
                                                 
38 Scott v Shepherd (1773) 2 Wm Bl 892. 
39 Meir Dan-Cohen, ‘Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self’ (1992) 105:5 Harvard Law 
Review 959. 
40 Ibid 965. 
41 Ibid 990. 
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recognition to automatism to allow its application in situations where the 
response is not to flee but to retaliate. This argument points clearly towards 
making provocation both a complete defence and a basis for mitigation of 
damages, due to the potential for different degrees of provocation and 
different levels of free will inherent in an individual act. The exact nature and 
extent of the operation of the defence should depend on how much free will 
appears to have been engaged in the defendant’s actions. The severity of the 
provocation in terms of its likely effect on a reasonable person, together with 
the reasonableness of the defendant’s response, should both be considered. 
E Likeness to Criminal Law 
In State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Wiegold it was stated that if, in a 
suit at tort, a tortfeasor were exonerated of an act that he had already been 
found guilty of in a criminal trial, it ‘would generate the sort of clash between 
civil and criminal law that is apt to bring the law into disrepute’.42 The 
defendant cannot be found both guilty and innocent in any sensible system, 
unless the difference results purely from procedural technicalities.43
If the plaintiff breaks into the tortfeasor’s house, and the tortfeasor beats 
him beyond what is reasonably necessary for defence of self or of property, 
can the tortfeasor claim that the plaintiff has contributed to his own injuries? 
If a motorist changes lanes unsafely, so as to commit ... [a traffic] offence ... 
and at the next stop light the tortfeasor beats him in a fit of road rage, can 
the tortfeasor claim that the plaintiff has contributed to his own injuries? If a 
wife insults and enrages her husband, and he hits her, can he argue that she 
brought the beating on herself? If a husband finds his wife with another 
man, is he justified in beating his wife or her lover? Is the damage or loss 
“caused” by the precipitating conduct of the plaintiff? This raises issues of 
causation and policy.
 This is a 
very good reason to maintain consistency between tort and criminal fields of 
laws. (Crimes are of such a nature that the assignment of moral culpability 
ought not to be compromised, unlike the case in civil matters where liability is 
strict). The judgment in Wilson turns on this point and assigns full 
responsibility for torts amounting to crimes to the tortfeasor. Slatter J 
proposed a number of crime situations in which the transfer of responsibility 
from victim to perpetrator would be most inappropriate: 
44
                                                 
42 (1991) 25 NSWLR 500, 514 (Samuels JA). 
 
43 Ibid. 
44 Wilson v Bobbie (2006) ABQB 22, [18]. 
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Outcomes like these would limit any court’s willingness to change the law in 
the way considered here. But Slatter J seems to have conceived of the 
assignment of blame as an all-or-nothing proposition. Yet one need not 
assume that the sharing of blame need result in anything remotely like that. A 
victim of a tort might be found just one per cent to blame, or indeed 99 per 
cent to blame.45
One may reasonably expect the High Court to prefer to keep the criminal and 
tort law treatment of provocation in symmetry. If one were to achieve a wider 
effect for provocation in tort law, one might also have to ask the High Court 
to widen the effect of provocation at criminal law equivalently. It would take 
an overwhelming argument to achieve this. It also seems unlikely that the 
High Court would change the law as argued here when Parliament can 
intervene in a much more elegant fashion. It would therefore be difficult to get 
the existing authority of Fontin overruled, but the preceding arguments do 
appear to carry substantial weight, so it may not be impossible. Nevertheless 
statutory law reform may be a more likely resolution to the problems raised 
here.  
 All that is needed is a rule that, to whatever extent the tort 
was the defendant’s fault, the defendant must pay, and to whatever extent it 
was the plaintiff’s fault, the plaintiff must bear it. Unless a civil court 
mitigated damages by 100 per cent, or unless, in a particular case, heavy 
mitigation undermined the notion of criminal intent, the civil court would 
technically not be in disagreement with the criminal court. Moreover, when a 
criminal court hands down a suspended or heavily mitigated sentence for a 
serious crime, this is often done in order to recognise that the defendant was 
not entirely to blame; the shifting of blame at tort toward a provocateur 
plaintiff has the same function. The adjustment of a sentence is analogous to 
the adjustment of the total sum of damages, whether compensatory or 
otherwise. 
However, whether it is even desirable to maintain a likeness between tort and 
criminal approaches to the fault element in an act of provocation must be 
considered in the light of whether the two bodies of law treat the fault the 
same way. If they treat it differently then it is plausible that differing 
outcomes for the same set of facts are to be understood in exactly the same 
way as would be the case where a contravention of civil law is sued upon at 
contract, tort and equity, resulting in divergent outcomes. 
                                                 
45 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 26(1)(b) requires a court when considering a plaintiff’s contributory 
negligence to torts generally to adjust damages downward to an appropriate extent. Section 63 
allows damages for an action in negligence to be reduced by up to 100 per cent. 
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The test to be looked at here is whether, in tort law, mitigation of exemplary 
damages is a reaction to the plaintiff’s wrongdoing or to the defendant’s 
reduced fault, or both. Slatter J in Wilson observed that there is neither a tort 
nor a crime of provocation,46 which suggests that the law would not regard 
provocation as a wrongdoing that needs a judicial response. That puts 
emphasis on the defendant’s state of mind. Furthermore, in the criminal case 
of Kirkham,47
III POLICY ARGUMENTS REGARDING LAW REFORM 
 it was said that provocation commutes a criminal charge of 
murder to manslaughter due to society’s compassion for the defendant’s 
human frailty, and not in recognition of any reduced fault on the defendant’s 
part. It is significant that this rule came into being when the death penalty still 
existed, making it highly undesirable that a provoked murder should be 
treated the same way as one originating entirely from the defendant’s free 
choice. On this very superficial examination, the criminal concept and the tort 
concept then appear to be quite alien to each other, which might encourage a 
divergence in the law in spite of the apparent disparities that would be 
created.?? But there is little ground presented here on which to establish such 
a distinction and further study is warranted. 
A Bullying 
A person can be provoked in small ways that would not necessarily prompt a 
reasonable person to engage in, or threaten, violence. An example might be 
the use of a nickname such as ‘fatso’ or ‘stupid’. Even if such provocation 
were repeated occasionally, there may be an expectation that a reasonable 
person would allow it and ignore it. But, when subjected toimportunate 
repetition of such names in a spirit of derision or ridicule — such that it 
amounts to bullying — a reasonable person would become enraged so that 
threats and attacks in response are to be expected. The law as it stands 
supposes that it is a better outcome that bullying should continue rather than 
that the victim should turn the tables with a decisive self-help remedy. It is 
well known that prolonged bullying, especially for children, can have a 
profound effect on self esteem and social adjustment, and can even lead to 
psychiatric harm. By the time a recognised psychiatric condition has emerged, 
on which a victim can sue in negligence,48
                                                 
46 Wilson v Bobbie (2006) ABQB 22, [25]. 
 it is likely to be far too late. But for 
the law to be ameliorated adequately, the current requirement of immediacy or 
47 Kirkham, above n4. See also discussion of Kirkham in Smith, above n 6. 
48 As required by statutes such as the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 72(1). 
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directness (as in Gordon) needs to be liberalised in like manner as the 
criminal law has been to deal with domestic homicides following learned 
helplessness. 
Provocation could be constituted by physical contact of an annoying or 
generally threatening nature.49
B Moral Justifiability of Some Trespasses 
 As the law stands, if the provocative behaviour 
were quickly to become more and more extreme so as to pose a credible 
threat, the defendant, responding violently, could argue self defence and avoid 
damages altogether. In the absence of a fully fledged defence of provocation, 
should a defendant retaliate maybe seconds before the threat arises (perhaps 
pre-emptively on a disputable assumption of attack), the defendant would 
have to pay damages for any resulting injuries. (The author of this article has 
personally observed incidents in which intending attackers purposefully pose 
a growing threat in order to build disabling fear in their intended victim, so 
that a threatening response early on is the only practical defence to prevent a 
real attack from taking place). Without this reform the defendant provoked in 
this way must countersue for trespass. Doing so may result in a desirable sum 
in damages being awarded. But, apart from the apparently adequate sum, on 
the suit of the plaintiff the law puts him in the right in spite of his 
wrongdoings and, on the countersuit of the defendant, the law holds the 
opposite. This is an inelegant and frankly ridiculous outcome since the actual 
findings reached in a court of law are supposed to be taken as the final 
statement of the parties’ rights, obligations and blame. The practice of 
countersuit in such a context is not an inherent feature of the law but it is a 
necessary band-aid fix in the absence of an adequate law. 
A number of points have been raised in this article, above, with respect to the 
moral justifiability of some trespasses. A few further points should now be 
made. It is morally correct that self-defence should be a complete defence. 
Blay has taken this further and has argued that the principle applies equally 
‘...where a plaintiff causes a defendant to lose his self-control and to react in 
the heat of passion...’.50
                                                 
49 Although in itself that is a trespass on which the defendant can counter-sue we shall 
disregard that possibility and concentrate on improving the concepts with which the law 
formed. 
 But that assumes all provocation is intentional, 
whereas provocation can be accidental or the behaviour may even be well 
intentioned, though misunderstood. Furthermore, to compare thoughtless 
aggression with a necessary response to danger is incorrect, and, yet again, 
50 Blay, above n 13, 156. 
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self-defence can be undertaken with a cool head and in that case would not 
resemble a provoked response at all. But the defence of self-defence does 
apply in provocative situations. Blay is correct in recognising that the 
provoked response is sometimes unavoidable and reasonable, so that there is a 
point of overlap where trespass should be justifiable.51
C Vigilantism 
 
Slatter J stated in Wilson that: 
The law should obviously discourage people from provoking others in ways 
that might cause them to lose control. This objective must be balanced 
against the competing objective of discouraging persons from responding to 
provocation with criminal acts.52
In my view, this is a circular argument. If an act is criminal then the law has, 
by declaring it criminal, already established sanctions against it. If his Honour 
meant to refer not to technical criminality, but to the ethical principles that the 
law seeks to embody, then in the end he was only referring to self-help 
remedies that go to the extent of unreasonableness and foul play. If an act is 
not unreasonable, then the law should not forbid it, except to soothe the 
sensibilities of genteel fellows, and to avoid encouraging people to push the 
envelope to the detriment of others around them. His Honour indicated that 
matters should be directed to police or else sued on, rather than dealt with 
through vigilantism. Vigilantism is a real concern in North America, but far 
less so in most developed countries such as Australia. On the usual meaning 
of ‘vigilantism’, a vigilante response is a delayed response as it has to be 
organised through a network of communication or by discussion of some sort. 
Such a delay is prima facie evidence of malice afore-thought, the mens rea of 
a crime, and existing criminal authorities on provocation require directness or 
immediacy to distinguish a provoked response from an original act. Even if 
that requirement were liberalised so that the provoked person might smoulder 
for a while before lashing out in rage, provocation can only be pleaded by the 
person provoked, not by a group of friends and relatives. Therefore a change 
in tort law regarding provocation is not going to encourage vigilantism. 
Where a provocative act results not in automatism but in a response in the 
interests of justice, there is a question as to whether the defendant was acting 
in the defence of others and would therefore be exonerated. The only concern 
is whether the defendant has gone too far. 
 
                                                 
51 Ibid? 
52 Wilson v Bobbie (2006) ABQB 22, [31]. 
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Blay has also made the point that maintaining the current law does not prevent 
self help. When reacting to provocation in the heat of the moment, a 
defendant simply cannot, while reacting, stop and think about legal 
consequences.53
Vigilantism also has its merits when an offender is caught in the act and dealt 
with in a fair and sensible manner. When police fail to intervene as requested, 
while a harmful or morally repulsive act is in progress or is likely to be 
repeated, ordinary citizens are in fact acting positively in the interests of law 
and order by taking matters into their own hands. The Tasmanian case of 
Downham v Bellette
 It is well recognised in science and in law that human nature 
includes a capacity to lose control, to stop thinking and to act reflexively. As 
discussed in relation to Scott v Shepherd above, when experiencing the fight 
or flight response, a person is no more morally in the wrong in relation to the 
provocateur plaintiff than an unmarried person is to be criticised for falling in 
love at an inconvenient juncture. 
54 is raised by Blay as an example of just how bad social 
behaviour can get, and how little the law of torts will permit the victims to do 
in defence of themselves and their own. As part of a neighbourhood dispute, 
the plaintiff took to defecating on the driveway of one defendant. He was 
caught one night doing so while armed with a rifle. He was held under 
citizens’ arrest by the defendants and beaten. The police were called but 
eventually instructed the defendants to release the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
succeeded in suing for assault, battery and false imprisonment. Underwood J 
held that ‘although the plaintiff’s conduct was reprehensible it did not justify 
the assault and subsequent period of false imprisonment’.55 He found that 
‘defecating on the first defendant’s driveway ... was the immediate and 
precipitating cause of the assault and false imprisonment’.56
IV CONCLUSION 
 It is relevant to 
ask whether such disapproval exists in dominant social values or only in the 
abstractions of the law and the philosophical views of those most deeply 
opposed to violence per se. This case stands as a good example of the very 
worst performance of the justice system, such as would provoke the ire of any 
common decent person. 
This article has shown that the law of trespass to the person as it stands 
requires a level of behaviour that is uncommon and unnatural, albeit high 
                                                 
53 Blay, above n 13, 155. 
54 (1986) Aust Tort Reports 80-038. 
55 Downham v Bellette (1986) Aust Tort Reports, 67,827. 
56 Downham v Bellette (1986) Aust Tort Reports, 68,830. 
222 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 15 NO 2 
minded. It is shown here that the law can be changed to reflect more 
accurately the best of actual human nature, rather than an ideal of what human 
nature can become. Existing law has been analysed and it has been found to 
deal inadequately when compared with common knowledge of interpersonal 
conflict. While there is authority in New Zealand for the recognition of 
provocation in some cases of trespass, the Victorian Supreme Court has ruled 
it out on grounds of precedent. The notion of a victim’s fundamental right not 
to be touched or threatened in an unwelcome way as a basis for ignoring 
provocation has been shown to be unrealistic and inconsistent with 
contributory negligence in negligence law. An argument of implied consent to 
a trespass has also been put on the basis of a Canadian authority, and a 
negative upshot of such a law is identified. Implied consent is also 
distinguished from the more extreme issue of automatism, which is argued on 
the basis of long established British law. An issue is identified that if the law 
were changed in the manner argued for, trespass law would be at odds with 
the equivalent criminal laws. But a cursory argument is made that a 
fundamental distinction may already exist in the two concepts of and 
approaches to provocation, which may justify ignoring what superficially 
seems like an inelegant contradiction. Policy arguments are then put to give 
practical reasons for changing the law. Those reasons are bullying, the 
inherent moral justifiability of some trespasses, and an argument is put against 
a judicial objection to the encouragement of vigilantism. 
 
